Hence the doctrine of Kant, that Nature as known to science is phenomena, means one thing in Kantism and another thing in science.
It is most important also to notice that Kantism denies, but science asserts, the logical power of reason to infer actual things beyond experience.
Having, however, made a deduction, which is at all events consistent, that on Kantian assumptions all we know is mental phenomena, Lange proceeded to reduce the rest of Kantism to consistency.
Reason, according to Wundt, is like pure reason according to Kant; except that Wundt, receiving Kantism through NeoKantism, thinks that reason arrives at " ideals " not a priori, but by the logical process of ground and consequent, and, having abolished the thing in itself, will not follow Kant in his inconsequent passage from pure to practical reason in order to postulate a reality corresponding to " ideals " beyond experience.
Nevertheless, in spite of all this Kantism, he adhered to his natural realism.